Thursday, February 28, 2013

Leaving Las Vegas



Greetings

      It's days like today when I feel the urge to go to New Mexico.   Warm  Dry  Ahhh....
   
     But things may be changing in the Southwest.   (Actually everywhere  -   see e.g. More than 1 in 3 U.S. counties could face a “high” or “extreme” risk of water shortages by 2050  , 

     

"In some key areas, including the Southwest, parts of California, and the central and southern Great Plains, “important reservoirs are left with little or no water” in some scenarios. In the Colorado River Basin, for instance, “Lakes Powell and Mead are projected to drop to zero and only occasionally thereafter add rather small amounts of storage before emptying again.”


 Of course, the Southwest is just the canary in the proverbial coal mine,  Lets take a quick look at the droughts maps predicted by NCAR (National Center for Atmospheric Research) . By 2030, things are pretty hot!    By the time we get to 2060 things begin to look bad. ...with perhaps over 80% of the country mired in severe drought (exceeding -3) or worse, including the Midwestern agricultural heartland."

 







Study: Climate change may dry up important U.S. reservoirs like Lake Powell and Lake Mead

by Jeff Spross, originally published by Climate Progress  | TODAY
Lake Mead and Hoover Dam water intake towers, with previous water level, July 2009. (Photo credit: Cmpxchg8b)
As climate change makes the regions of the West, Southwest, and Great Plains warmer and drier, water demand will continue to increase, and the combined effect will place an ever greater burden on the country’s fresh water supplies — possibly completely draining important reservoirs in those areas, under some scenarios. That’s according to a new study authored by researchers with Colorado State University, Princeton and the U.S. Forest Service, and flaggedyesterday by Summit County Citizens Voice.
This is consistent with other studies on the risk of future water shortages: The Department of the Interior is anticipating that by 2060 the gap between river supply and water demand in the states of the Colorado River Basin will be 3.2 million acre feet due to climate change. Research published in Environmental Science and Technology found that by 2050 one third of U.S. counties could face “high” or “extreme” risk of water shortage. And the International Energy Agencydetermined that if current policies remain in place, fresh water use by the energy industry alone could more than double — from 66 to 135 billion cubic meters annually by 2035.
Climate change, substantially driven by global warming and humanity’s carbon emissions, is anticipated to lead to more weather extremes in various areas — longer periods of low precipitation and water shortage in many areas, interspersed with greater deluges. And, of course, higher average temperatures to bake the same regions as they dry out. The Forest Service study used a number of different scenarios in its models, assuming different levels of future population growth, economic growth, and temperature increases:
[F]uture climate change will increase water use for agricultural irrigation and landscape maintenance in response to rising plant water requirements, and at thermoelectric plants to accommodate rising electricity demands for space cooling. Including these effects, per-capita withdrawals are projected to drop only moderately for the next few decades and then level off as the effects of climate change become greater, and total withdrawals are projected to rise nearly continuously into the future. Projected withdrawals differ across the global emissions scenarios examined, especially in the latter decades of the century.
Although precipitation is projected to increase in much of the United States with future climate change, in most locations that additional precipitation will merely accommodate rising evapotranspiration demand in response to temperature increases. Where the effect of rising evapotranspiration exceeds the effect of increasing precipitation, and where precipitation actually declines, as is likely in parts of the Southwest, water yields are projected to decline. For the United States as a whole, the declines are substantial, exceeding 30% of current levels by 2080 for some scenarios examined.
Here’s just one example of several permutations the study did, laying out the changes in future water yields in 2020, 2040, 2060 and 2080. The A1B scenarios were relatively middle-of-the-road, assuming medium population growth, high economic growth, and medium temperature increases in the future:
And here’s the projected changes in annual water consumption under that same permutation, accounting for the effects of climate change:
In some key areas, including the Southwest, parts of California, and the central and southern Great Plains, “important reservoirs are left with little or no water” in some scenarios. In the Colorado River Basin, for instance, “Lakes Powell and Mead are projected to drop to zero and only occasionally thereafter add rather small amounts of storage before emptying again.”
In many ways the problem is already beginning to bite. It looks like the historic droughts that have wracked the West, the Southwest and the Plains areas for the last two years may very well continue through the spring and summer. And Texas and Oklahoma, plus Texas and New Mexico, are involved in suits over rights to water use and river flows — with the latter dispute scheduled to go all the way to the Supreme Court.
“We were surprised to find that climate change is likely to have a much greater effect on future water demands than population growth,” Forest Service research economist Tom Brown, who led the study along with CSU’s Jorge A. Ramirez, told Summit County Citizens Voice. “The combined effects of climate change on water supply and demand could lead to serious water shortages in some regions.”

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

The world according to Smil


Greetings

    When Vaclav Smil talks people listen.  He's an adviser to Bill Gates.  He's written 30 books about energy, and especially energy transitions.

    He suggest we just go on an energy diet.  Go back to the  amount of energy we used in the 1960's.   
   
    But he doesn't think its too likely. 

   Here's what he is saying:

"Americans are living beyond their means, wasting energy in their houses and cars and amassing energy-intensive throwaway products on credit," he recently wrote in Foreign Policy magazine.
Yet no U.S. politician has yet advocated a reduction in fossil fuel energy use by 40 per cent even though avoiding catastrophic climatic change now demands such behavioural changes.
"We will never act voluntarily. It will have to collapse. That's optimistic," he quips.
....
"China will speed the day of reckoning and India is coming next," he says. He calls the new fossil fuel gobbling economies "riders of the apocalypse." Their energy ascent is physically not possible without an energy descent in the developed world, explains Smil.

Can we live again in 1964's energy world?

"Everything has to get worse. We are behaving so badly."
Vaclav Smil, you should know, talks very fast in staccato bursts and doesn't own a cell phone.
The University of Manitoba professor, perhaps one of Canada's most precise energy analysts, also doesn't want to be the servant of a communication machine.
"Everyone wants a piece of me," he adds. Authorities from China, Japan, Russia and the United States pester him with speaking invitations and information requests all the time. Even Microsoft billionaire Bill Gates makes demands on him.
And that's because Smil actually knows something about energy in a world that has grown largely energy illiterate, thanks to a now threatened diet of cheap hydrocarbons.
For nearly 40 years now, Smil, a Czech émigré and polymath, has studied the world's energy systems. He grew up in the political darkness of the Soviet Empire and has matured in the moral emptiness of its American counterpart.
Although heralded around the world for his insights, he remains largely unknown in Canada. Yet the prolific academic has penned some 30 books and 400 articles on how the world recklessly spends both energy and valuable natural resources.
All of Smil's work is dense, number-filled, literate and chock full of intriguing history. Altogether, his energy writing delivers a sober two-pronged message: North Americans have grown fat and lazy by burning too many fossil fuels. Yet energy transitions are by their very nature protracted, difficult and unpredictable.
Wood to coal
Although oil shocks and boomtowns can unsettle economies in just years, real energy transitions in large global economies often unfold over decades if not generations, Smil observes.
Take one of the world's first major energy transitions from wood to coal as a source of heat, he says. At first aristocrats considered coal a foul and smoky substitute for wood. But a tree famine in northern Europe and England forced along the hydrocarbon's adoption by the 17th century.
It really took the invention and deployment of the steam engine to transform coal into an empire builder. Even so, coal didn't provide the world with nearly 90 per cent of its primary energy until 1930 before being partly replaced by oil.
So transitions take a long time. "The 19th century was a wood century and the 20th was a coal century." Oil didn't reach its peak as central energy source until the 1970s and still accounts for one-third of the world's energy needs. In fact, the global economy remains a full-blown fossil fuel civilization that mines coal, oil and natural gas to satisfy the majority of its energy diet.
Even the transition from horse to car took a long time, adds Smil. In 1885, Gottfried Daimler built one of the world's first combustion engines. "Thirty-three years later the number of horses in the world peaked and then the transition went very fast." But it took 50 years to remove the horse from urban streets and farms.
Energized all the time
Our overwhelming dependence on fossil fuels creates another problem. In 1850, the average European or North American used energy intermittently.
You'd put the fire on in the morning, harness a horse or roll up some sails, says Smil. Energy use was organic and the night skies often fell dark.
Today people use energy 24/7 and at fantastic levels. Every home plugs into an ever-increasing number of glowing gadgets, each promising more comfort and entertainment than the last one. "There are no peaks and valleys. It's not just the quality but the constancy of energy use that has changed," explains Smil every so quickly.
Now don't get Smil wrong. He thinks modern societies consume way too much energy (North Americans consume twice as much as Europeans and yet aren't twice as smart or happy, he adds sarcastically). Moreover, we lavishly waste much of it on the overproduction of cheap and unnecessary junk.
He believes a transition to "non-fossil future is an imperative process of self-preservation" as well as a moral necessity. Harnessing renewable energy flows, is both desirable and inevitable, he adds.
But the old-fashioned engineer and historian doesn't think the transition to cleaner forms of energy will be easy, quick, rational or smooth.
That's a lot of exajoules
One of the first obstacles is just the amount of quantifiable fossil-fueled power that must be replaced. Consider, says Smil, that North Americans gobbled up about six exajoules (EJ) of energy in the form of wood, animal power, coal and some oil in 1884. (The Japanese earthquake and tsunami released about two EJ of energy.)
Today North Americans happily burn our way through 100 EJ of which only 7 EJ come from renewables, such as hydroelectric dams. In other words, the U.S. would have to find 85 EJ from wind, geothermal or wind or "nearly 30 times the total of fossil fuels the country needed in the mid-188s to complete its shift from biomass to coal to hydrocarbons." That's a tall order requiring new infrastructure and massive re-engineering.
The second issue for Smil is capacity. Renewables such as wind and solar just don't have the same ability to make concentrated energy as fossil fuels. Capacity is the constancy of energy that an electrical power plant can actually deliver divided by what it could produce if it operated 24/7. No power plants, of course, work that way.
Nuclear plants, if they are not leaking or down for repairs, can operate 90 per cent of the time. Coal-fired plants can chug along 65 per cent of the time before they need to be cleaned and repaired. But a solar installation can only pump out juice 20 per cent of the time. A wind farm can muster power 25 to 30 per cent of the time or slightly more if perched offshore.
Next comes power density. It's the rate of flow of energy per unit of land area. A coal mine or oil field can deliver great power density. So, too, can a hydroelectric dam. But not renewables. Fossil fuels, despite their declining quality, still offer power densities two to three times greater by orders of magnitude than wind, biofuels or solar.
Smil then offers an uncomfortable calculation. In the early years of the 21st century, the fossil fuel industry (mining, processing and piping) occupied 30,000 square kilometres, or an area about the size of Belgium. The low power densities of renewables, just to replace one-third of the demand for fossil fuels, would require a land base of 12,500,000 km for turbines, solar arrays and transmission lines. That's a territory the size of the U.S. and India.
Renewable challenges
To Smil each renewable or alternative to fossil fuels offers a unique challenge. He thinks that solar, of all renewables, offers the greatest potential. It's the only alternative that currently delivers flows of energy that readily surpass the demand for fossil fuels.
But capturing and transporting those flows at the right commercial scale still proves elusive. "We don't yet have the storage capacity. Solar energy works only when the sun shines."
Nuclear, he says, is "as dead as it can be." It promised cheap energy but delivered the world's least economic source of power as well as persistent waste issues. Only Alberta wants to build nuclear reactors to manufacture more bitumen, a proposal he calls "madness incarnate."
Wind will require millions of turbines and massive land disturbance that may be "environmentally undesirable and technically problematic." It's also an intermittent source of power that requires extensive back-up, usually in the form of coal-fired stations. And in large parts of the world the wind simply does not blow regularly.
Biomass or growing modified trees, sugar-rich crops or algae to fuel inefficient vehicles poses another problem altogether. Civilization has already appropriated 40 per cent of all plant growing activity on Earth for food, fibre and feed. This appropriation has already modified, reduced and compromised ecosystems to "a worrisome degree." Devoting more the world's precious soils to produce something like ethanol, says Smil, is "stupid."
Refashioning a 'supersystem'
The engineer's bottom line is sobering, if not completely politically incorrect. Over the last 100 years the world has spent trillions of dollars building the most extensive energy network ever conceived. Millions of machines now essentially run on 14 trillion watts of coal, oil and natural gas. The quality of these fuels is declining, and keeping the whole show going is getting more and more expensive every day.
Refashioning what Smil calls the world's costliest "supersystem" into something cleaner and sustainable will be a gargantuan task that requires "generations of engineers."
"Yet everyone is broke. So how are we going to build hundreds of billions worth of solar and wind farms?"
To Smil the only moral response remains a "significant reduction in fossil fuel use." The scientist proposes going back to the future -- or the 1960s, to be precise.
"In the 1960s people didn't have three car garages, fly to Las Vegas to gamble or drive SUVs, but they lived comfortably," says Smil. More importantly, they consumed 40 per cent less energy than people today.
"We can return to 1964 with no problem. Living in 1964 is not a sacrifice."
Nor would getting there impose draconian challenges. Switching to 97 per cent energy efficient furnaces (that means they burn 97 per cent of the gas instead older varieties which send 55 per cent up venting stacks), mandating diesel-fueled vehicles and deploying high speed trains would all be part of the solution.
"Bombardier makes rapid trains in this country," declares Smil. "Yet there is not high speed train between Montreal and Toronto. Canada doesn't have a significant high speed link. It's incredible!"
'It will have to collapse'
Smil recognizes that reduced energy use is not yet seen as desirable or politically unacceptable but "replacing entrenched precepts," he adds, is never easy.
In the absence of "radical departures" from that status quo, Smil sees but one all-too human reality:
"Everything is going to have to get worse."
That seems to be the global course at the moment, as oil dependent jurisdictions such as Japan, North America and Europe pretend their "overdrawn accounts, faltering economies and aging populations" don't exist.
Smil, for example, regards China's rise as an industrial and authoritarian superpower as a copycat of the worst excesses of the U.S. energy experience. To Smil, a long-time opponent of the Three Gorges Dam, the Chinese may well outdo Americans in gratuitous materialism.
"China will speed the day of reckoning and India is coming next," he says. He calls the new fossil fuel gobbling economies "riders of the apocalypse." Their energy ascent is physically not possible without an energy descent in the developed world, explains Smil.
"There is no shortage of delusionary people," adds Smil. "I'm a stupid, old fashioned 19th century engineer. Things move slowly."
In fact, no society has really begun any transition other than that of collective global economic stagnation and accelerating investments in fossil fuels.
"Americans are living beyond their means, wasting energy in their houses and cars and amassing energy-intensive throwaway products on credit," he recently wrote in Foreign Policy magazine.
Yet no U.S. politician has yet advocated a reduction in fossil fuel energy use by 40 per cent even though avoiding catastrophic climatic change now demands such behavioural changes.
"We will never act voluntarily. It will have to collapse. That's optimistic," he quips.
You know, he repeats, "Living in 1964 is not a sacrifice."
The conversation ends. Another investigator wants to pump Smil for more straight energy talk.
But perhaps his best advice still remains the concluding sentence of a 2011 article in American Scientist:
"None of us can foresee the eventual contours of new energy arrangements -- but could the world's richest countries go wrong by striving for moderation of their energy use?"
Next Wednesday in Andrew Nikiforuk's 'The Big Shift': What drove our last big shift, from horsepower to steam, and upheavals it caused.

MANY DOWNSIDES TO HIGH ENERGY SPENDING

Vaclav Smil, one of the world's greatest energy analysts and thinkers, has long argued that the key to managing energy supplies is to consume less energy, not more. The pursuit of higher energy spending does not make us richer or wiser, says Smil.
Nor does high energy consumption improve security, happiness, equality or build stronger democracies, adds Smil.
In fact, Smil advocates a return to energy consumption levels prevalent during the 1960s. That means using one-third less energy than currently consumed by the average North American household. "We must break with the current expectation of unrestrained energy use in affluent societies," says Smil.
In Smil's Energy in Nature and Society, the scientist highlighted some uncomfortable truths associated with high energy spending.
High energy spending makes civilizations fragile.
"Expansion of empires may be seen as perfect examples of the striving for maximized power flows, but societies commanding prodigious energy flows, be it late imperial Rome or the early 21st century United States -- are limited by their very reach and complexity. They depend on energy and material imports, are vulnerable to internal malaise, and display social drift and the loss of direction that is incompatible with the resources at their command."
High energy spending fosters insecurity.
"The Soviet Union nearly doubled post Second World War per capita energy use but with a crippling share channeled into armaments. Enormous energy use could not prevent economic prostration, a fundamental reappraisal of the Soviet strategic posture and Mikhail Gorbachev's initiation of long overdue changes."
High energy spending weakens economic prosperity in agriculture.
"Increased energy subsidies may be used with very poor efficiency in irrigation and fertilization, may support unhealthy diets leading to obesity, or may be responsible for severe environmental degradation incompatible with permanent farming (high soil erosion, irrigation-induced salinization, pesticide residues)."
High energy spending encourages materialism but not cultural greatness.
"It is enough to juxtapose the Greek urban civilization of 450 BCE with today's Athens or Florence of the late 15th century with Los Angeles of the early 21st century. In both comparisons, there is a difference of one order of magnitude in per capita use of primary energy and an immeasurably large inverse disparity in terms of respective cultural legacies."
High energy spending does not bring happiness.
"Just the reverse is true: it tends to be accompanied by greater social disintegration, demoralization, and malaise. None of the social dysfunction -- the abuse of children and women, violent crime, widespread alcohol and drug use -- has ebbed in affluent societies, and many of them have only grown worse."
High energy spending diminishes human diversity.
"In natural ecosystems the link between useful energy throughputs and species diversity is clear. But it would be misleading to interpret an overwhelming choice of consumer goods and the expanding availability of services as signs of admirable diversity in modern high energy societies. Rather, with rampant (and often crass) materialism, increasing numbers of functionally illiterate and innumerate people and mass media that promote the lowest common denominator of taste, human intellectual diversity may be at an historically unrivalled low point."
High energy spending does not lead to greater energy savings or efficiencies.
"Efficiency gains in engines or electrical gadgets have not been invested wisely but applied to the overproduction of short-lived disposable junk and into dubious pleasures and thrills promoted by mindless advertising."
High energy spending does not improve quality of life.
"Higher energy flows actually erode quality of life first for populations that are immediately affected by extraction or conversion of energies, eventually for everyone through worrisome global environmental changes."
From: Energy in Nature and Society by Vaclav Smil (MIT Press).
Award-winning journalist Andrew Nikiforuk has been writing about the energy industry for two decades and is a contributing editor to The Tyee. Find his previous Tyee articles here.
This series was produced by Tyee Solutions Society in collaboration with Tides Canada Initiatives Society (TCI). Funding was provided by Fossil Fuel Development Mitigation Fund of Tides Canada Foundation. All funders sign releases guaranteeing TSS full editorial autonomy. TSS funders and TCI neither influence nor endorse the particular content of TSS' reporting.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Best Case - Ecotechnic Future

Greetings

    Lets take a look at the bright side, shall we ?

    After all sales of wind and solar are growing by leaps and bounds  see e.g Solar capacity reaches 100 GW, projects 330 by 2020.      

     In fact they are growing so fast that  unities in Europe, where solar growth is greatest,  are putting pressure on governments to reduce  subsidies see e.g. utilities balk at losing most profitable sales (of peak power),  

      Which also raises the really thorny question of all that "stranded capital" that the utilities will still be paying for , after they shut down the coal and gas plants .  see e.g. Over 1000 coal plants planned.     

    But first, look at what would happen if growth continued at its current pace:



     Pretty cool!   Of course there are a few little technical details still to work out - like storage, but .....

"Now, of course, I'm not saying that the red and green curves in the graph above are how things will go quantitatively.  No question there will be some slowing in the later stages.  The need to integrate renewables and electricity-using technology into all aspects of life is bound to slow things down toward the end.  Ditto the need to integrate renewables planet-wide to cope with their intermittency. "


Now , if you compare that graph with the graphs of what it will take to stay under our carbon budget,  you will see that it is within the realm of possibility.  If we peak at 2020, and ifwind and solar grow so fast they not only stop new coal and gas plants from being built, but cause old plants to be torn down.   Torn down at a rate of about 10% per year - so they are all down by 2040.      It's not impossible.  

Peak emissionsClick for larger version.
Image: Kevin Anderson, “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change    .  


.  


FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 2012

Climate Change Action is Not Hopeless


It's easy to feel hopeless about climate change.  The weather gets crazier with each passing decade and in the meantime it seems like society is hardly doing anything at remotely the relevant scale.  Americans refuse to conserve very much, and the Chinese and Indians are burning coal at an ever more rapid pace.

One way to picture the seeming hopelessness of the situation is to plot total global energy consumption against solar and wind capacity (the two leading truly sustainable energy sources).  That looks like this:


That looks terrible right?  Those two lines at the bottom are negligibly different from zero on the scale of our total energy consumption - that blue line, which continues to head inexorably upward after the briefest of interruptions for the great recession.

But that isn't the full picture.

What it conceals is that the growth rates are completely different.  Over the last ten years of data (all from BP by the way), the average growth rate in primary energy consumption is 2.7%.  Meanwhile, the wind energy grew at 25% and the solar energy grew at 44%.  And this makes all the difference!  Those are incredibly high growth rates and mean that the awe-inspiring power of exponential growth is on our side.

To illustrate in a somewhat cartoonish fashion*, let's look at what happens if we just extrapolate out those same growth rates to 2040:


We spend the next decade with the graph still looking pretty bad, but then the power of exponential growth starts to really show, particularly in the solar line, and we see that the renewables would get to the scale of the entire planet's energy use sometime in the ballpark of 2030.

So to look at the situation now and say that it's hopeless is like looking at an acorn growing its first handful of leaves and declaring that the little sapling is hopeless and that this will never amount to an oak tree.

An ecotechnic world - one in which we drive around in electric cars, and heat our houses and offices with heat pumps, and fly around on biofuels, and power the whole thing from the sun and the wind, is doable.  But it's in its infancy.  It's the acorn, not the tree already.

And that being the case, the most important thing by far is that we shelter that acorn: keep it watered, shade it if the sun gets too strong, give it steady doses of fertilizer.  It's the growth rates in solar and wind energy that are the critical things to watch.  As long as those are high, the situation is not hopeless, regardless of how much coal use is growing.

Now, of course, I'm not saying that the red and green curves in the graph above are how things will go quantitatively.  No question there will be some slowing in the later stages.  The need to integrate renewables and electricity-using technology into all aspects of life is bound to slow things down toward the end.  Ditto the need to integrate renewables planet-wide to cope with their intermittency.

So maybe it takes us to mid-century to get to a near carbon-neutral society.  The point is that it's not hopeless.  As the weather gets worse - the droughts, the storms, the melting ice - the denialists will look sillier and sillier and the pressure for action will rise.  And as it does, the solutions will increasingly be in place.  So don't be discouraged if electric car sales are tiny right now, or solar power is a very small fraction of total energy use.  This is a long game.

Also worth noting is that it's in a couple of decades, as the alternatives truly start to reach scale, that it will be the time to really focus on closing down all the coal mines and shutting in the oil wells.  That will be the time for hefty carbon taxes and punitive cap-and-trade regulations.

Right now, the focus should be on protecting and growing the ecotechnic acorn.

* Wonky footnote - yes, I know I'm comparing renewable capacity to energy use without accounting for the capacity factor.  But it's also true that electricity is much more useful than primary fossil fuel energy - for example it can be utilized with 3X higher efficiency in a motor, or power a heat pump with a coefficient of performance of 3X or 5X.  So let's just call it a wash for the purposes of a quick illustration of the general idea.

Sunday, February 24, 2013

Return to Mesa Verde



Greetings

       This one must have slipped through the net.  Its from a paper from Nature Climate Change.  Paper:  here (PDF).  Hidden away in the paper, (and not mentioned in the press releases), is the projection that the Southwest is likely to experience a "mega drought", comparable to the  droughts which occurred around 1200 AD which lasted 75 to 200 years.   

       And this mega drought is projected to start in 8 years?

      Here is the statement from the paper:

Anthropogenic climate change is projected to lead to a potential reduction of Colorado River flow comparable to the most severe, but temporary, long-term decreases in flow recorded. (5)

   And the explanation

"This "most severe, but temporary, long-term decrease in flow recorded" is the concept we need to understand. This is the megadrought reference. A 10 percent reduction beginning 2021 to 2040 is extreme enough for these researchers to compare the average conditions projected for the very near future to the 12th Century megadrought. This single message is critical and it was missed by popular reporting. Just to be sure I am clear: this quote "temporary, but long-term decreases in flow" here refers to these 75- to 200 year-long megadroughts, the last one occurring about 1,000 years ago or in the 12th Century. These droughts were temporary, like the droughts of today, but in thenear future, conditions comparable to these droughts will be the average climate condition. Dry periods that we know as drought today will be on top of megadrought dryness."

Just to make sure there was no mistake, the reporter contacted one of the authors

"Truthout wrote Professor Seager and asked him to confirm the assumption that natural drought cycles would add to or be on top of the projected megadrought drying. He confirmed, adding, "For the next one to three decades, results are not greatly different across the [different scenarios] because so much of what will happen is already in the pipeline, so to speak."

What does this mean? It means that even the best-case scenario that the IPCC is now considering results in an outcome that is the same, or "not greatly different," from the worst-case scenario of the new IPCC scenario family, for the next 10 to 30 years."

---------------

Worst Drought in 1,000 Years Could Begin in Eight Years

Thursday, 21 February 2013 09:27By Bruce MeltonTruthout | News Analysis
Beginning in just eight years, we could see permanent climate conditions across the North American Southwest that are comparable to the worst megadrought in 1,000 years. (1)
The latest research from the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University published in December 2012 has some truly astounding news. The megadroughts referred to in the paper published in Nature Climate Change happened around about 900 to 1300 AD and are so extreme that they have no modern counterpart for comparison (these megadroughts will be referred to in the following as the "12th century megadrought"). The research was funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
We have been warned for decades that we would be facing a megadrought if we did not do something about climate pollution. We did not, and now according to the projections of a new study, that is just what the future may hold. And remember, projected conditions similar to the worst megadrought in 1,000 years would be the baseline conditions. Dry periods, which we normally refer to as drought times today, would be superimposed on top of the megadrought extremeness.
The Lamont-Doherty research not only includes one of the four new climate scenarios, but also uses the new high-resolution climate models that provide more detail and accuracy. Both will be found in the forthcoming 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (IPCC 2013). The authors tell us about the new climate scenario:
The RCP85 scenario involves stronger anthropogenic radiative forcing [than the old IPCC scenario] and was chosen to reflect the present lack of any international action to limit CO2 emissions.
Let me interpret. "RCP85" is one of four new scenarios the IPCC has requested the research community to prepare. The four scenarios were chosen from existing international research literature in 2007 at a meeting in the Netherlands consisting of 130 international stakeholders.
The old scenarios (40 of them) were based on a complex "storyline" involving the way our global society changed over time, what type of and how much energy we used, when and how fast we changed our land from forest to fields, how quickly population grew or did not grow, and different population growth rates in different regions. The new scenarios represent the concentrations of greenhouse gas pollutants in the atmosphere and the amount of warming they create instead of the vastly varying emissions of the old scenario storylines. (The "RCP" in the scenario's name means Representative Concentration Pathways.) The new scenarios do not represent any one future snapshot of the way our society evolves. Different evolutionary paths could result in the same greenhouse gas concentrations. The new scenarios are the simple end result of greenhouse gases emitted to our atmosphere by any number of societal evolution pathways. It's a simpler process, and it updates the old scenarios prepared in 2000 with current greenhouse gas data. It also reflects a revelation in research that because we have failed to act on climate change, the old worst-case scenario was optimistically good. (2)
The new models have more grid squares (higher resolution) in that they can "see" a smaller piece of the earth compared to the old models. The old models took forever to run on supercomputers, and so do the new ones, but we can see smaller areas and smaller scale climate processes are better represented now. The new models also include volcanoes, changes in the sun's strength and more complex interactions between clouds and pollutants like nitrous oxides and sulfur dioxides (both manmade and natural), and their results agree better with observations of our past climate.(3)
The results of the new scenarios and most current modeling (as compared to the old scenarios and models) are that warming is greater, drying in dry areas is greater and increasing wetness in wet areas increases further. (4)
And just to finish up translating that quote, as I have been doing for four paragraphs now, let's take "Anthropogenic radiative forcing." "Anthropogenic" is human-made; and "radiative forcing" refers to the stronger-than-normal greenhouse warming we will experience because of climate pollution. Of equal importance in the quote is the acknowledgement, in a peer-reviewed research publication, that there has been a lack of action in the international community on reducing CO2. This type of statement is something we are seeing more of these warming days.
The results of the new research are critically deserving of an alarmist tone. That we could slip into profound continuous drought so soon is certainly a surprise to most of us, to say the least. The typical consensus opinion of unrestrained climate pollution impacts by the year 2100 only tells us that permanent drought will come to many parts of the world and, basically, that dry areas could become drier. The news that we could be experiencing permanent drought on the scale of megadrought proportions - beginning in only eight years - should be considered a global threat of the highest order.
So why, once again, is there no alarm? The prepublication press release for this paper came out on December 23 and while it did get picked up by a few sources, the only major outlet was Agence France Press. All of the coverage referenced the 10 percent reduction in streamflow that this work's modeling projects for the near future. This seemingly small number appears to have limited journalists' interest in the results of the research as a whole. No one who wrote about the paper seems to have recognized the megadrought reference.
Implications for increased evaporation and the seasonality of the projected drying, both of which the authors say were important, were only regurgitated from the press release with little additional thought. It is the megadrought reference, however, that gives us a true understanding of exactly how worried we should be.
The NOAA Climate Variability and Predictability Program's press release at Columbia University gives us an authoritative view of this research:
Long tree ring records allow estimations of past variations in Colorado River flow and suggest a 15% reduction of flow during the 12th Century megadrought. Therefore the new paper concludes ... 
Anthropogenic climate change is projected to lead to a potential reduction of Colorado River flow comparable to the most severe, but temporary, long-term decreases in flow recorded. (5)
This "most severe, but temporary, long-term decrease in flow recorded" is the concept we need to understand. This is the megadrought reference. A 10 percent reduction beginning 2021 to 2040 is extreme enough for these researchers to compare the average conditions projected for the very near future to the 12th Century megadrought. This single message is critical and it was missed by popular reporting. Just to be sure I am clear: this quote "temporary, but long-term decreases in flow" here refers to these 75- to 200 year-long megadroughts, the last one occurring about 1,000 years ago or in the 12th Century. These droughts were temporary, like the droughts of today, but in the near future, conditions comparable to these droughts will be the average climate condition. Dry periods that we know as drought today will be on top of megadrought dryness.
In 2004, Edward Cook and a team of researchers published a paper in Science that describes this 12th century megadrought. These researchers were from Lamont-Doherty, as well as NOAA, the National Climatic Data Center and the Universities of Arizona and Arkansas.
The 12th century megadrought was a part of a series across western North America over a 400 year period. According to the authors, it "dwarfs" the ongoing western drought we are currently experiencing. (6) This ongoing western drought also differs in a surprising way from the Dust Bowl, as we can begin to see in the graphic below and as I will explain further:
Current western drought pales in comparison to prehistoric megadrought. Conspicuously absent from this record is the Dust Bowl. This data was averaged using a 60-year period. This “averaging” smooths out the record of the Dust Bowl because it was short and situated more in the Great Plain instead of across the entire U.S. West.Current western drought pales in comparison to prehistoric megadrought. Conspicuously absent from this record is the Dust Bowl. This data was averaged using a 60-year period. This “averaging” smooths out the record of the Dust Bowl because it was short and situated more in the Great Plain instead of across the entire U.S. West.
This work by Cook and colleagues was compiled from tree rings found in some really odd places, like ancient Anasazi cliff-dwelling timbers and tree stumps beneath the waters of lakes in the Great Basin that were alive during the megadroughts and were subsequently submerged as the lakes rose afterwards. Clues were also found in sediment deposits in North Dakota, evidence of drifting sands in Nebraska and lichen residue in Texas. These megadroughts were powerful enough to lower the level of the lakes in the Great Basin (including Great Salt Lake) by 200 feet and change parts of the Great Plains into a sea of shifting sand.
What the above graph shows us is the great difference between the megadroughts and our current western drought. The century scale length of the megadrought periods is profound relative to drought our society has experienced. Even more striking is the relationship between the current western drought and the Dust Bowl. In the graph above, the Dust Bowl does not appear to be represented and there are a couple of reasons for this.
The Dust Bowl was a little more centered in the Plains. Cook looked at all of the United States west of the Mississippi River. But more importantly, the graphic above uses a 60-year smoothing. What this means is that the graphic shows us the 60-year average of drought conditions. Because the Dust Bowl lasted only about 10 years, its extremeness is diminished in the averaging process for the smoothing. To see the relationship between the Dust Bowl and the current western drought more easily, see the graphic below, which does not include 60-year smoothing:
This image shows the details of drought area across the western U.S. without averaging. This image shows the details of drought area across the western U.S. without averaging. The authors tell us the following about the current Western Drought, “Its 4-year duration appears to be unusual over the past 104 years.”
The current western drought, though it has not yet lasted as long as the Dust Bowl and its worst peak has not been quite as high, shows more continuous red uninterrupted by wet years. This continuous stress is much worse on an ecosystem than an extreme drought punctuated with a year or two of wetness here and there, like we saw in the Dust Bowl. Cook and his team also observed that the four-year duration of the current drought "appears to be unusual over the past 104 years." This "four-year duration" is based on their data, which ended in 2003. The drought did ease somewhat in 2005 and then again in 2009 and 2010, according to archived maps found on National Drought Mitigation Center's Drought Monitor. Otherwise, it has been in existence across large parts of most of the American West since Cook's work was published in 2003. (7)
The Dust Bowl was also a singular event strongly enhanced by agricultural practices. A series of wet years in the early 20th century lulled us into thinking that the Great Plains region was an agricultural nirvana. Sodbusters arrived by the tens of thousands and ripped the moisture-sustaining prairie grasses from the land with little thought to long-term consequences. When dry times returned, little of the natural prairie grasses remained to conserve moisture. This led to more evaporation than normal - aggravating the drought. With the increased dryness came increased winds, themselves induced by the drought. The winds made evaporation even higher; the Dust Bowl ensued and sands began to move.
Today, modern agricultural practices diminish the wholesale drying experienced during the Dust Bowl, but extreme drought persists in the West. This is because the average temperature in the West has warmed at nearly twice the global average according to the Rocky Mountain Climate Change Organization. (8)
There are a few more things I need to mention to drive home the significance of the 10 percent reduction in stream flows. One is timing. The modeling shows that spring, summer and fall see a greater reduction in flows in most places than in winter. In many places, more mountain precipitation is now falling as rain in the winter, and this will increase. More runoff in winter means less snowpack, less water slowly percolating down into the aquifers, lower aquifer levels and a longer evaporation season as the snowpack disappears early. (9)
Compounding the increased length of the evaporation season, a little more warmth means a lot more evaporation. It is not a one-to-one relationship. The impacts are compounded in one more way. In the high country where most of the West gets its water, a little warming, and its corresponding evaporation, takes water that should slowly melt and feed aquifers or run off into reservoirs and evaporates it directly into the sky.
Another confusing aspect of this work is that numerous places in the press releases, and in the findings themselves, tell us and show us in graphic form that not all seasons in all areas experience drying and increased evaporation. The Columbia University press release tells us that, "The Colorado headwaters are expected to see more precipitation on average," and the NOAA Climate Variability and Predictability Program press release at Columbia tells us that, "Despite the fact that precipitation might increase in some regions and seasons (e.g. winter in northern California)." The most telling example of this climate confusion comes at the bottom of the Columbia University press release. This statement by Mingfang Ting, one of the paper's authors and a specialist in precipitation extremes, tells us: "For Texas, the models predict that precipitation will decrease and evaporation rates will also go down in spring and summer, but only because "there is no moisture to evaporate." (10)
Climate scientists have been pulling this alarm for 20 years. It is real - the building is on fire. To pull the fourth alarm on this one: Truthout wrote Professor Seager and asked him to confirm the assumption that natural drought cycles would add to or be on top of the projected megadrought drying. He confirmed, adding, "For the next one to three decades, results are not greatly different across the [different scenarios] because so much of what will happen is already in the pipeline, so to speak."
What does this mean? It means that even the best-case scenario that the IPCC is now considering results in an outcome that is the same, or "not greatly different," from the worst-case scenario of the new IPCC scenario family, for the next 10 to 30 years.
Things will get far worse if we do not do something about climate pollution as fast as we can. But there is good news. Reality tells us that, contrary to what the voices of denial and delay are saying, the solutions to climate pollution will be no more expensive than the cost of clean drinking water across the planet every day. (11)
References:
1.
Permanent climate conditions across the North American Southwest that are comparable to the worst megadrought in 1,000 years ... Seager et al., Projections of declining surface water availability for the southwestern United States, Nature Climate Change, December 2012, page 5, last paragraph.
2.
Scenarios: Old scenarios (SRES) are emissions based... IPCC Special report on Emissions Scenarios, see Foreword.
New Scenarios (RCP) are based on radiative forcing, or warming caused by greenhouse gases... Intergovernmental Panel On Climate Change, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), first paragraph.
Creation of New Scenarios... Moss et al., Towards New Scenarios for Analysis of Emissions, Climate Change, Impacts, and Response Strategies, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva, 132 pp, 2008, first paragraph, page i. http://www.aimes.ucar.edu/docs/IPCC.meetingreport.final.pdf
3.
New Climate Models... Knutti and Sadlacek, Robustness and uncertainties in the new CMIP5 climate model projections, Nature Climate Change, October 28, 2012, last paragraph, left column, page 1.
Old models, future CO2 concentration... United Nations Environmental Program, GRID ARENDAL, Past and Future CO2 Concentrations.  (accessed 021313)
4.
The results are that warming is greater, drying in dry areas is greater and increasing wetness in wet areas increases further... Knutti and Sadlacek, Robustness and uncertainties in the new CMIP5 climate model projections, Nature Climate Change, October 28, 2012. This statement is reflected in Figures 1, 2 and 3 on pages 2 and 3.
5.
Long tree ring records allow estimations of past variations in Colorado River flow ... comparable to the most severe, but temporary, long-term decreases in flow recorded ... NOAA Discussion of the paper, last two paragraphs, accessed January 30, 2013.
6.
Dwarfs the current western drought ... Cook et al., Long Term Aridity Changes in the Western United States, Science, November 2004, page 1017, top of page right column.
7.
Unusual in the last 104 years ... Ibid. page 1017, second paragraph, right column. Drought conditions since 2004: North American Drought Monitor.
8.
The Rockies have seen nearly twice the average global warming... Hotter and Drier: The West's Changed Climate, Rocky Mountain Climate Organization, February, 2008, page iv. The American West experienced 70 percent more warming than the average for the rest of the world.
9.
More mountain precipitation is falling as rain in the winter ... Ibid., page v.
10.
There is no moisture to evaporate... State of the Planet, Water Matters, Smaller Colorado River Projected for Coming Decades, Study Says, sixth paragraph, accessed on January 31, 2013.
The Colorado headwaters are expected to see more precipitation on average...Columbia University Press Release, Sixth paragraph.
Despite the fact that precipitation might increase in some regions and seasons (e.g. winter in northern California)... NOAA Climate Variability and Predictability Program press release, forth paragraph.
11.
The solutions to climate pollution will cost 1 percent of global GDP per year ... The annual cost, for about the last 100 years - every year - for providing our global society with clean drinking water has been about 1 percent of global GDP annually, at $500 billion. Alley, Richard. Earth: The Operators' Manual, WW Norton, 2011.
Other things that cost one about $500 billion per year:
-Annual US military budget has averaged $500 billion since about 1980, not counting wars.
-Advertising at $500 billion per year globally. $492 billion in 2011. Forecast to $629 by 2015.
-Agriculture damages from normal weather at $500 billion per year in the US alone. In the US alone we see $485 billion normal weather damages to agriculture every year. Lazo et al., US economic sensitivity to weather events, American Meteorological Society, June 2011. Press release.
-US health care costs in 2009 were five times the cost of global clean drinking water at $2.5 trillion per year.  
This article was first published on Truthout and any reprint or reproduction on any other website must acknowledge Truthout as the original site of publication.